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Abstract
The most prominent industry concentration index, the Herfindahl-
Hirschman index (HHI), yields a higher concentration level in response
to any merger between firms, thus implying that any merger will de-
crease the social welfare. Although HHI is the index used by the
Anti-trust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice, its merger im-
plications are not fully embraced by the anti-trust authorities; in prac-
tice, the Anti-trust Division allows many mergers - especially among
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Cem Karayalcin, Charles Register and Peter Thompson for their thoughtful insights and
comments. (Corresponding Author: Nejat Anbarci; Phone: (305) 348-2735; Fax: (305)
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smaller firms - which clearly cannot be justified on the basis of HHI.
We propose a class of concentration indices that is in line with the
spirit of the Anti-trust Division’s merger policies and consider diﬀer-
ent theoretical models which indicate that the Anti-trust Division is
justified in allowing such mergers, as they counter the market power
of dominant firms.
1 Introduction
In 1982, the Department of Justice replaced the standard four firm con-
centration index (C4) with the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) as its
primary tool in scrutinizing potential mergers.1 Whereas C4 adds up the
market shares of the top four firms to calculate industry concentration, HHI
is more complete and elaborate in that it uses a weighted average of market
shares of all firms. Nevertheless, HHI yields a higher concentration level
in response to any merger between firms, thus implying that any merger
will decrease the social welfare. Realizing this shortcoming of HHI, the De-
partment of Justice (DoJ) has continuously adjusted its merger criteria to
allow for mergers that are deemed to increase eﬃciency without causing a
significant reduction in competition.2
1The Anti-trust Division of the merger policy stands out as the most active area of the
U.S. anti-trust policy. Between 1994 and 2003, the U.S. Department of Justice conducted
about 160 merger investigations annually, while conducting about 130 other investigations
such as actions against price-fixing cartels and against firms engaging in anti-competitive
practices; e.g., the case against Microsoft (Anti-trust Division Workload Statistics 1994-
2003).
2The Anti-trust Division of DoJ allows some mergers as long as the HHI index stays
under .18 after the merger and the merger does not cause an increase of more than .01.
Further, mergers involving any financially troubled firms (failing firms) are treated more
leniently. Thus, the merger implications of HHI are not fully embraced by the anti-
trust authorities. The 1992 Merger Guidelines of the Anti-trust Division in a sense
stress this fact by stating that ”[w]hile challenging competitively harmful mergers, the
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No better example of DoJ’s departure from HHI can be found than its
approval of the October 2001 merger of Chevron and Texaco which followed
the footsteps of the British Petroleum/Amoco/Arco and Exxon/Mobil merg-
ers, none of which involves any small firms. Many industry practitioners such
as the former CEO of British Petroleum, John Cross, supported the approval
of this merger by DoJ. Cross, referring to the Chevron and Texaco as “mid-
size” firms, added that “they were not big enough to take on the big guys”
(Worthen, 2002). That is, in his estimation, the merger was necessary for
the survival of the firms and was thus good for competition.3
The basic idea behind DoJ’s departure from HHI involves the trade-oﬀ
between reducing the number of firms in an industry versus increasing eﬃ-
ciency and/or market share symmetry in the market. Theoretical results and
empirical findings in the industrial organization literature almost invariably
support DoJ’s departure from HHI.4 For example, Levin’s (1990) extension
Agency seeks to avoid unnecessary interference with the larger universe of mergers that
are either competitively beneficial or neutral” (Anti-trust Division (1992, p. 3)). One of
the additional reasons for the half-hearted use of HHI by the anti-trust authorities seems
to be that, especially in a contestable market or in one that approaches contestability,
HHI has even less significance. Another seems to be that, restrictions on mergers can
adversely aﬀect entry by reducing subsequent liquidity that the disposition of assets via
sale through merger oﬀers. (We thank Michael Gort for raising this point.)
3Interestingly, this merger was deemed necessary by industry experts as early as by
March 1999. Then, Fadel Gheit, an oil analyst with Fahnestock & Co said: ”BP’s
purchase of Amoco and Arco and Exxon’s takeover of Mobil, all within the last eight
months, sends a very clear wake-up call to the unattached that you have to act quickly or
it’s going to be too late. In my view, Texaco will be the first to go, then Chevron soon
after, unless they merge as a single company” (BBC News, 1999).
Equally interestingly, Lopez (2000) states that ”the deal has already received support
from the Clinton administration despite ... the concentration of the oil industry among
a few major players. US Energy Secretary Bill Richardson told reporters last week: ’My
initial view is positive ... I think this is an inevitable result of the global economy’. A
former director of the FTC’s Bureau of Competition, William Baer, explained that the
Chevron-Texaco deal would come under scrutiny, but that in order to compete against
their bigger rivals they were left with no other option.”
4In a notable theoretical exception, Daughety (1990) presents a model where asymme-
try can lead to welfare increases. However, unlike the model that we pursue in Section
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of the Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds’ (1983) Cournot model shows that merg-
ers of firms with less than 50% of the total market share enhance welfare even
if the merged firms do not continue to engage in Cournot competition. Like-
wise, Akgun (2004) uses a model initially developed by McAfee and Williams
(1992) to show that if competition entails neither a Bertrand or Cournot set-
ting, but rather a hybrid of them in which firms compete based on supply
schedules, then symmetric markets are socially optimal. Hence, although a
merger may reduce the number of competitors, welfare may increase if the
merger results in a more symmetric industry. Gugler et al. (2003) provide
empirical support for these models by presenting strong evidence that among
mergers that increase profits, those involving larger firms achieve these prof-
its by increasing their market power, while mergers involving smaller firms
achieve higher profits by increasing eﬃciency.
Given that HHI is clearly no longer in line with DoJ’s goals, we pro-
pose an alternative class of indices to measure an industry’s concentration.
Specifically, our class of indices yields a higher concentration level when merg-
ers involve the largest firm(s), but a lower concentration level when mergers
occur among smaller firms.
We also consider theoretical models that illustrate the potential benefits
of mergers among smaller firms and compares their predictions to the welfare
implications of our index and HHI. In particular, we first consider a model
in which one large “national” firm competes in separated markets against
regional firms. Not surprisingly it turns out that, although mergers between
regional firms will decrease the number of firms in the industry, overall wel-
3 below, his notion of asymmetry is based on the classification of firms as leaders and
followers rather than on market share asymmetries caused by the firms’ production costs.
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fare is enhanced if the mergers generate synergies. Particularly appealing,
however, is the fact that these mergers are welfare enhancing under diverse
forms of competition (Cournot and Bertrand). In addition, we examine sim-
ulations based on Akgun’s (2004) model of supply-schedule competition and
provide the welfare implications of mergers that do not involve the largest
firm.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the proposed class
of indices and analyzes its features especially concerning various merger possi-
bilities. Section 3 provides the theoretical models and simulations regarding
socially beneficial mergers. Section 4 concludes.
2 Concentration Indices
Let the market shares of n firms be listed as v1 ≥ v2 ≥ ... ≥ vn > 0. As
mentioned above, the most prominent concentration index in the industrial
organization literature is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI): HHI =
(a1v1 + ...+ anvn), where ai = vi. Observe that the weights, a1, ..., an, sum
to one. The other notable concentration index, the four-firm concentration
ratio, C4, does not depend on the market shares of firms which are not the
largest four firms. Neither does it assign diﬀerent weights to diﬀerent market
shares of the firms.
As alluded to in a footnote above, the Anti-trust Division of DoJ uses
HHI mainly in the following way: If HHI increases by less than .01 as a
result of a horizontal merger and if the industry’s HHI measure does not
exceed .18 after the merger, a horizontal merger is allowed. It is likely to be
challenged otherwise.
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There are two other notable concentration indices. The one proposed
by Hall and Tideman. (1967) stresses the need to include the number of
the firms in the calculation when measuring the concentration level of an
industry (the number of firms measures the ease of entry into that particular
industry). Let n firms be ranked such that the firm with largest market
share v1 is Firm 1, the firm with next largest market share v2 is Firm 2 and
so on. Let i denote each firm’s rank. The Hall-Tideman concentration
index HTI is 1
(2
?n
i=1 ivi)−1
. Like HHI, HTI also increases in any mergers.
Another notable concentration index is an index of entropy, E = −
?n
i=1 vi log vi
(see Hart (1967, p. 78) for a discussion). Unlike the other indices consid-
ered so far, it does not have a range of 0 to 1; it takes the value 0 when the
market structure is a monopoly and takes a value far exceeding 1 when the
market structure is perfect competition. Any merger increases the industry
concentration according to this index too.
Before introducing our index, we will first consider a property proposed
by Hall and Tideman (1967) (Property 5, p. 164), and then a stronger version
of it.
• Weak Symmetry (WSym): Suppose there are n identical-sized firms.
Then, the industry concentration decreases in n for any index I.
• Strong Symmetry (SSym): Suppose there are n identical-sized firms.
Then, for any index, I = 1
n
.
No doubt, a symmetric market with n firms is socially more beneficial
than a symmetric market with n firms, such that n > n ≥ 1. The above
symmetry properties capture this idea at diﬀering degrees. Observe that
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HHI( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
) = n( 1
n2
) = 1
n
. Clearly, HHI( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
) decreases in n. Note
also that HTI satisfies both SSym and WSym while E violates SSym, yet
satisfies WSym in its own way (recall that the value of E increases as n
increases). Likewise, C4 does not satisfy SSym but satisfies WSym.5
Our proposed class of indices has diﬀerent concentration implications than
these other indices when horizontal mergers do not include the largest firm(s).
Consider each Firm i’s market share relative to that of the largest firm,
vi
v1
. Then the total of number of firms in that industry, relative to the
largest firm’s market share, becomes v1
v1
+ v2
v1
+ ... + vn
v1
. We first consider a
concentration index where market shares of firms are measured in terms of
the largest firm’s market share.
I∗(1) =
1
(v1
v1
)2 + (v2
v1
)2 + ...+ (vn
v1
)2
=
1
[(v1)2 + (v2)2 + ...+ (vn)2]
1
(v1)2
=
(v1)
2
(v1)2 + (v2)2 + ...+ (vn)2
.
Observe that, I∗(1) = (v1)
2
HHI
. Further, observe that I∗(1)( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
) = 1
n
. Thus,
5Dansby and Willig (1979) studied industry performance indices that measure the
potential social gains from appropriate government interventions (such as anti-trust, reg-
ulatory, and deregulatory actions). Their performance indices establish welfare theoretic
basis for indices such as C4, HHI, and so on. Essentially, Dansby-Willig versions of
these indices incorporate a weight assigned to them. This weight is the inverse of the
price elasticity of the industry demand. Note that Dansby-Willig versions of these indices
do not satisfy the Strong Symmetry property but do satisfy the Weak Symmetry property.
Some indices (such as the one by Blackorby, Donaldson and Weymark (1982) who use a
Cobb-Douglas functional form) assign weights to not only on firms’ market shares but also
on the total output. Not surprisingly, such indices too fail to satisfy the Strong Symmetry
property but typically do satisfy the Weak Symmetry property.
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I∗(1) satisfies SSym (and thus WSym).
Table 1 provides a few examples to illustrate the stark diﬀerences between
HHI and I∗(1).
Table 1: A comparison of HHI and I∗ Under Diﬀerent Market Structures
Market Shares HHI I∗(1)
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97
70 30 .58 .84
51 26 11 11 1 .35 .74
51 37 11 1 .41 .64
40 37 11 11 1 .32 .5
40 37 9 9 5 .32 .51
33 33 33 .33 .33
50 50 .5 .5
55 45 .52 .6
55 35 10 .44 .7
55 25 20 .41 .75
40 40 20 .36 .44
40 40 10 10 .34 .47
40 20 20 20 .28 .57
I∗(1) measures the industry concentration when there is a single dominant
firm. Although there may be industries in which increasing the market share
of the second largest firm may cause a reduction in the industry price, in many
industries a reduction in price cannot be achieved until a higher critical
number of large firms is reached. Lamm (1981, p. 75) reports empirical
findings from the food retailing industry that in many urban markets “growth
in the 3 largest firms’ shares have a significant positive eﬀects on prices ... In
contrast, an increase in the market share of the fourth largest firm causes a
reduction in food prices.” This clearly indicates that the number of dominant
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firms in a market may be greater than one. This prompts us to consider the
m-dominant firms version of I∗(1), where 1 < m < n.
I∗(m) =
1
v21
v21+...+v
2
m
+
v22
v21+...+v
2
m
+ ...+ v
2
n
v21+...+v
2
m
=
1
[(v1)2 + (v2)2 + ...+ (vn)2]
1
v21+...+v
2
m
=
v21 + ...+ v
2
m
(v1)2 + (v2)2 + ...+ (vn)2
.
Observe that, when m > 1, I∗(m) =
v21+...v
2
m
HHI
. Further, observe that
I∗(m)( 1
n
, ..., 1
n
) = m
n
. Thus, I∗(m) does not satisfy SSym but satisfies
WSym instead. The following proposition describes how I∗(m) behaves in
mergers that do and do not involve the largest firm.
Proposition 1 (1) Suppose a merger does not involve m largest firms and
does not make the new firm one of them largest firms. Then I∗(m) decreases.
(2) Suppose a merger involves one of the m largest firms. Then I∗(m)
increases.
Proof: (1) Since [(v1)
2+(v2)
2+ ...+(vn)
2] increases in any merger, I∗(m) =
v21+...+v
2
m
(v1)2+(v2)2+...+(vn)2
must decrease in any merger that does not involve any of
v1, v2, ..., vm. (2) Consider I
∗(m) =
v21+...+v
2
m
(v1)2+...+(vm)2+...+(vn)2
. Suppose Firm i
and Firm j merge such i ≤ m and j > m. Thus, after the merger I∗(m) =
v21+...+v
2
i−1+v
2
i+1+...v
2
m+(vi+vj)
2
v21+...+v
2
i−1+v
2
i+1+...+v
2
m+(vi+vj)
2+...+(vj−1)2+(vj+1)2+...+(vn)2
. Let A = (v1)
2 + ... +
9
(vm)
2 and B = (v1)
2 + ...+ (vm)
2 + ...+ (vn)
2; hence, B > A. Thus, I∗(m)
becomes A
B
and I∗(m) becomes
A+(vi+vj)2−v2i
B+(vi+vj)2−v2i−v2j
.
Then I∗(m) ? I∗(m) reduces to Bv2j + Bvivj ? A2vivj. Since B > A,
we obtain I∗(m) > I∗(m).
The next proposition describes how much I∗(m) increases when a Firm
j merges with Firm i instead of with Firm i where vi > vi > vm > vj.
Proposition 2 Consider a merger M between Firm i and Firm j, and a
merger M  between Firm i and Firm j, where vi > vi > vm > vj. Then
I∗(m,M) > I∗(m,M ).
Proof: I∗(m,M) =
v21+...+v
2
i−1+v
2
i+1+...v
2
m+(vi+vj)
2
v21+...+v
2
i−1+v
2
i+1+...+v
2
m+(vi+vj)
2+...+(vj−1)2+(vj+1)2+...+(vn)2
and
I∗(m,M ) =
v21+...+v
2
i−1+v
2
i+1+...v
2
m+(vi+vj)
2
v21+...+v
2
i−1+v
2
i+1+...+v
2
m+(vi+vj)
2+...+(vj−1)2+(vj+1)2+...+(vn)2
.
Let A = (v1)
2+ ...+(vm)
2 and B = (v1)
2+ ...+(vm)
2+ ...+(vn)
2. Thus,
I∗(m,M) becomes
A+(vi+vj)
2−v2i
B+(vi+vj)2−v2i−v2j
and I∗(m,M ) becomes
A+(vi+vj)
2−v2
i
B+(vi+vj)
2−v2
i−v
2
j
.
Then I∗(m,M) ? I∗(m,M ) reduces to A+v2j+2vivj
B+2vivj
? A+v2j+2vivj
B+2vivj
. Since
B > A+ v2j and 2vivj > 2vivj, we obtain I
∗(m,M) > I∗(m,M ).
The implication of the preceding proposition is that, according to I∗(m),
a merger between a small firm and a relatively large dominant firm will
increase the concentration in that industry more than a merger between the
same small firm and a relatively small dominant firm will. The table below
considers several diﬀerent market settings in an attempt to gauge how HHI
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and I∗ respond to proposed mergers. Table 2 considers several diﬀerent
market settings and allows for various combinations of merging firms. In
each row, merging firms’ pre-merger market shares are denoted with a box
around them. For instance, Rows 1-5 entail a situation in which there is
one dominant firm and six identical smaller firms. All of the smaller firms
merge in Row 1, five of the smaller firms merge in Row 2, and so on. The
last two columns furnish the predicted changes in the two indices. Observe
that HHI increases while I∗ decreases for each merger.
Table 2: Changes in HHI and I∗ Resulting from Mergers
Market Shares HHI I∗(1) Change in HHI Change in I∗(1)
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97 .08 -.13
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97 .06 -.09
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97 .04 -.06
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97 .02 -.03
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 .50 .97 .01 -.01
70 10 10 10 .52 .94 .06 -.10
70 10 10 10 .52 .94 .02 -.03
51 25 12 12 .35 .74 .15 -.22
51 25 24 .38 .68 .12 -.16
60 20 10 10 .42 .86 .10 -.17
60 20 10 10 .42 .86 .02 -.04
60 20 20 .44 .82 .08 -.13
3 Theoretical Examples
While not technically demanding, the following theoretical models provide
support (in addition to that already found in the literature) for the idea that
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mergers not involving the largest firm need not decrease the social welfare.
The first two models consider Cournot and Bertrand competition between
one dominant firm and several smaller rival firms in separate markets. The
basic idea is that when smaller firms merge across regions, not only is it
profitable for them, but it also increases welfare in the market. This is
not surprising since costs are reduced in each market and the mergers do
not reduce the number of firms competing in each market; yet it provides a
plausible example that will serve as a benchmark when comparing our index
to HHI. The third theoretical setup considered is that of Akgun (2004)
where the equilibrium is in supply schedules.
3.1 Localized Cournot Competition
Let there be Z identical locations. A national firm N competes at each
of these locations against a local firm L.6 At each location, the inverse
demand is given by P (Q) = a − bQ where a, b > 0 and Qi = qN + qL with
qj denoting firm j’s output (i = 1, ..., Z). Let the cost function of firm j be
Cj(qj) = cjqj where cj =
1
kj
with kj > 0 being the overhead of firm j. The
standard asymmetric Cournot equilibrium gives firm j profits of
1
9b
[a+ ci − 2cj] [a− 2ci + cj]
yielding equilibrium consumer surplus of
1
9b
?
2a− ci − c2j
?2
,
6We assume that there is no monopoly involved in any market either pre- or post-
merger.
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resulting in total welfare in the pre-merger market of
1
3b
?
2a2 − 2acN − c2N
?
+
1
3b
?
4cNcL − 2acL − c2L
?
. (1)
Let m of the local firms merge. The post-merger cost function of this newly
merged firm becomes CM(qM) = cMqM where cM =
1?m
L=1 kL
. Clearly, welfare
in markets with non-merging firms does not change. However, welfare in
markets with newly merged firms becomes
1
3b
?
2a2 − 2acN − c2N
?
+
1
3b
?
4cNcM − 2acM − c2M
?
(2)
where cM denotes the new, lower marginal cost of the merged firm. Summing
Eqs. (1) and (2) over theM locations involved in the merger, and subtracting
Eq. (1) from Eq. (2) gives a welfare change of
m
3b
?
4cNcM − 2acM − c2M
?
−
m?
L=1
1
3b
?
4cNcL − 2acL − c2L
?
. (3)
Due to the assumption that merging firms create synergies by combining
capital stocks, Eq. (3) is positive. Hence, any merger that does not result in
a monopoly situation will increase welfare. It should, however, be noted that
we have tilted the scales in favor of mergers since mergers do not result in
fewer firms in any market. While this is true, it points to the inadequacy of
HHI as a guideline for mergers. Figure 1 examines the relationship between
welfare changes, I∗, and HHI. The horizontal axis measures the size of the
national firm in term of its capital stock, kN . The starting point is one
where all firms are of identical size and the national firm grows larger than
the regional firms as we move along the x-axis.
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Figure 1: Localized Cournot Competition
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Figure 1 shows that all mergers result in an increase in welfare. This is
not surprising since costs go down but the number of firms in each region
stays the same. Notice that the change in I∗ is always negative, indicating
that the merger should be allowed and is thus in line with the welfare changes.
The change in HHI, on the other hand, is always positive indicating that
the merger, although welfare enhancing, should not be allowed. Clearly, I∗
provides a better criterion for examining mergers within this framework than
does HHI.
3.2 Localized Diﬀerentiated Bertrand Competition
As in the previous section, assume that there is a National firm, N , with
CN(qN) = cNqN =
1
kN
. Imagine that this firm is located at a hub with unit
lines extending in Z directions. At the end of each unit line is a rival firm,
L, with CL(qL) = cLqL =
1
kL
, L = 1, ..., Z. Firm N engages in diﬀerentiated
Bertrand competition with each of its Z rivals. Let the position of the
hub firm along the unit line be zero and the location of the local firm be
one. Consumers are located uniformly along each unit line. A consumer at
location y receives a surplus of u0−ty−pN if they buy from the hub firm and
u0−t(1−y)−pL if they buy from the local firm, where t > 0 represents the lack
of desirability for a firm’s service stemming from exogenous diﬀerentiation
of the goods. By equalizing utilities, it follows that the central consumer is
located at ?y = pL−pN+t
2t
.
In this standard Hotelling game, firms N and L have equilibrium profits
15
of
πN =
1
18t
(3t+ cL − cN)2 (4)
πL =
1
18t
(3t+ cN − cL)2, (5)
consumer receive surplus of
? ?y
0
[u0 − ty − pL]dy +
? 1
?y
[u0 − t(1− y)− pN ]dy,
where the equilibrium prices are
pN =
1
3
(3t+ cL + 2cN) (6)
pL =
1
3
(3t+ cN + 2cL). (7)
Thus, pre-merger welfare is
u0 −
t
4
− (cn + cL)
2
+
5(cL − cN)2
36t
. (8)
Post-merger welfare in a single market is
u0 −
t
4
− (cn + cM)
2
+
5(cM − cN)2
36t
. (9)
Taking the diﬀerence between post- and pre-merger welfare levels and sum-
ming over the m markets from which the merging firms originate gives a
change in total welfare of
?
cL − cM
36t
?
[18t+ 5cL + 5cM − 10cN ] .
16
Under the assumption that mergers create synergies, the first term is positive
and hence the sign of the welfare change is simply the sign of
m(18t− 10cN)−
m?
L=1
5(cL + cM). (10)
Unlike the Cournot example, the welfare changes do not always favor mergers.
If the merging firms are “too” small (high c, low k) then the convexity of
the profit functions dictates that the gains in consumer surplus and profits of
the merged firms are not large enough to oﬀset the decrease in the national
firm’s profits. In that case, the second term will outweigh the first term in
(10) and the change in welfare will be negative. However, in non-“extreme”
cases, the first term will outweigh the second term producing a net increase
in welfare after the merger.
Figure 2 examines the relationship between welfare changes, I∗, and
HHI. The horizontal axis measures the size of the national firm in terms
of its capital stock, kN . The starting point is one where all firms are of
identical size and the national firm grows larger than the regional firms as
we move along the x-axis.
Notice that all mergers considered in this simulation result in an increase
in welfare. As in the Cournot model, this is not surprising since costs go
down but the number of firms in each region stays the same. Once again
I∗ is always negative, inferring that the merger should be allowed and is
thus in line with the welfare changes. Also, the change in HHI is always
positive indicating that the merger, although welfare enhancing, should not
be allowed. Once again, I∗ provides a better criterion for examining mergers
within this framework than does HHI.
17
Figure 2: Localized Bertrand Competition
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3.3 Competition in Supply Functions
The model considered here is from Akgun (2004) which follows from Klem-
perer and Meyer (1989). The model is a hybrid of Cournot and Bertrand set-
tings in the sense that firms’ equilibrium behavior is determined by strategi-
cally chosen supply functions with both price and quantity components. The
basic assumptions of the model entail a linear demand curve D(p) = a− bp
and a cost function for each firm of Ci(qi) =
q2i
2ki
where ki is firm i’s capital
stock. Firms produce according to their submitted supply functions at the
market clearing price p∗ defined by D(p∗) =
?n
i=1 Si(p
∗).
In equilibrium, each firm i submits a linear supply schedule with slope βi
such that
βi =
ki(b+ β−i)
ki + b+ β−i
, i = 1, ..., N (11)
where β−i is the sum of i’s competitors’ βs. Akgun shows that the equilib-
rium supply schedule submissions based on this system of equations can lead
to welfare increasing mergers. Under his formulation any merger is more
likely to increase welfare if it makes the firm size distribution more “sym-
metric” in the industry - the only decreasing eﬀect on welfare comes from
having fewer firms in the industry.
The primary diﬃculty with Akgun’s model is that the system of equations
defined by Eqs. (11) must be solved numerically in all but the most simple
cases. In order to provide a link between the game in supply schedules
and the prominent Cournot and Bertrand settings, he is forced to resort to
numerical simulations. We too use simulations based on his setup. However,
our simulations are aimed at measuring the welfare improvements generated
19
Figure 3: The Akgun Model
when small firms merge to compete against a dominant firm. As in previous
parts of this section, we oﬀer a graphical analysis of the relation between
welfare changes, I∗, and HHI. Unlike, the Cournot and Bertrand localized
competition settings, however, Akgun’s setup generates some instances where
welfare increases and others where welfare decreases as a result of a merger.
The following graph examines the relationship between welfare changes, I∗,
and HHI. The simulations start with six equally sized firms. The x-axis
measures the growth of one of these firms in term of its capital stock, k.
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In the beginning (the left-hand side of the graph) all firms are symmetric
in size. Hence, a merger reduces the symmetry of the industry and results
in a reduction in welfare as revealed by the change in welfare plot which
is below zero. However, when the dominant firm in the industry is large
enough (the right-hand side of the graph) a merger between two relatively
small firms forces the dominant firm to be more competitive and thus the
welfare begins to increase. In the beginning, both I∗ and HHI increase
with the prospect of a merger. However, as the size of the dominant firm
increases, I∗ begins to decrease, implying that the merger should be allowed,
while the change in HHI remains positive no matter how large the dominant
firm becomes. However, we must point out that there is a range where I∗
increases along with HHI, yet welfare actually increases. That is, while I∗s
merger implications are in line with welfare changes in the vast majority of
the cases we have considered in this section, clearly its merger implications
will not be flawless in all possible setups.
3.4 Additional Simulations
The above parts of this section presented examples and simulations where
the size of one firm was allowed to grow, but all other variables were held
constant. To provide a more comprehensive comparison of I∗ and HHI, we
now examine a number of diﬀerent industry structures and report the changes
in welfare predicted by each of the three models considered above. Table 2
presents results for mergers not involving the largest firm. The columns on
the left-hand side of the table yield the market shares of the firms (e.g. the
largest firm controls 70% of the market and there are six small firms, each
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controlling 5% of the market). A box around a small firm’s market share
indicates that the firm is part of the merger (e.g. all six small firms merge
in the first case, only five of the small firms merge in the second case, and so
on). The columns on the right-hand side of the table report the percentage
increase in welfare under each of the three set-ups considered in this section.
Table 3: Simulations for Various Market Settings
Market Shares Cournot Bertrand Supply Functions
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 26.4% 24.6% .20%
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 20.9% 19.6% .41%
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 15.3% 14.7% .48%
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 9.9% 9.7% .47%
70 5 5 5 5 5 5 4.6% 4.8% .41%
70 10 10 10 19.7% 19.4% .52%
70 10 10 10 9.1% 9.6% .43%
51 25 12 12 19.3% 28.7% .19%
51 25 24 6.6% 3.7% .05%
60 20 10 10 11.7% 17.5% .23%
60 20 10 10 12.9% 16.3% .25%
60 20 20 11.5% 13.2% .15%
It is clear from Table 2 that all mergers considered result in increases in
welfare. It is not surprising that the Cournot and Bertrand models predict
a larger increase in welfare as those models do not require a reduction in the
number of firms competing in a given market. Yet, Akgun’s setup reveals
that even when there is such a reduction in the number of firms as a result
of a merger, welfare will still increase. Recall from Table 1 that in all
these mergers HHI increases whereas I∗ decreases. That is, I∗’s merger
implications are fully in line with the welfare increases in those cases whereas
those of HHI are not.
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4 Concluding Remarks
As alluded to in the Introduction, the Anti-trust Division of the U.S. De-
partment of Justice does not fully embrace the merger implications of the
concentration index (HHI) it has oﬃcially adopted. The class of indices
proposed in this paper is substantially more in line with the Anti-trust Di-
vision’s guidelines and its recent practices regarding merger attempts. The
ideal market structure would consist of many symmetric firms. When the
distribution of firm sizes is significantly asymmetric, such that some domi-
nant firms have significantly greater market power than the rest of the firms,
a merger between two smaller firms can be welfare enhancing. As our the-
oretical examples and simulation results reveal, the basic intuition behind
such welfare increases of mergers between smaller firms is that although such
mergers will decrease the number of firms, they will increase the symmetry
of the industry thereby increasing welfare. Therefore, the Anti-trust Divi-
sion is justified in allowing mergers especially among smaller firms to counter
the market power of dominant firms. As such, the new class of concentra-
tion indices that we propose in this paper provides a much better fit with
the Anti-trust Division’s intentions and, compared to the existing concentra-
tion indices, it is much more relevant in assessing the welfare implications of
potential mergers.
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